Stabilisation of a landslide on the M25 highway London's main artery by Davies, J.P. et al.
Stabilization of a Landslide on the M25 Highway London’s Main 
Artery 
Estabilización del Deslizamiento de Tierra en la Autopista M25, la 
más Transitada de Londres 
Davies J P 
Hatch Mott MacDonald, 177 Milk Street, Boston, USA 
Loveridge F A, Perry J  




This paper describes the lessons learnt in the assessment, stabilization and subsequent monitoring of a landslide, 
which mobilized over 90,000 m
3 of material and threatened to completely close England’s busiest highway, the 
M25 around London.  The wedge shaped slide occurred on the 19
th December 2000 and extended some 80m up the 
slope with a slip surface up to 10 m below the ground surface.  Due to the strategic importance of the M25, the 
design and construction was fast tracked to be completed before the fall rains when further movements would be 
inevitable.  The adopted solution used a combination of 1050 mm diameter augered piles, a deep cutoff trench and 
counterforts at the toe and was extensively instrumented.  The collected data for the winter 2001/02 demonstrates 
that not only were the remedial works successful in stabilizing the slope but that the proposed design method can 
accurately predict the bending moments and forces produced in the piles. 
 
Resumen  
Este artículo describe las lecciones aprendidas en la evaluación, estabilización y subsiguiente monitoreo de un 
deslizamiento de tierra, el cual movilizó más de 90,000m
3 de material y amenazaba con cerrar por completo la 
autopista más transitada en Inglaterra, la M25 alrededor de Londres.  El deslizamiento en forma de cuña ocurrió 
el 19 de diciembre de 2000 y se extendió aproximadamente 80m hacia arriba con una superficie de deslizamiento 
de hasta 10m de profundidad.  Debido a la importancia estratégica que tiene la M25, el diseño y la construcción de 
la solución fueron adelantados rápidamente para evitar las lluvias, las cuales habrían generado desplazamientos 
adicionales. La solución adoptada usa una combinación de pilotes taladrados de 1050mm de diámetro con una 
trinchera profunda con contrafuertes en la base. El sistema se instrumentó ampliamente. La recolección de datos 
para el invierno de 2001/02 demostró que no solamente la solución implementada fue exitosa en estabilizar el 
talud, sino que también el método de diseño propuesto predice acertadamente los momentos flexionantes y las 





th December 2000 during the wettest 
winter in English history, a 200 m long section of 
Flint Hall Farm cutting failed and threatened to 
close England’s busiest highway, the M25 around 
London, which carries over 120,000 vehicles a 
day.  The failure extended from the hard shoulder 
for 80 m upslope and mobilized over 90,000 m
3 
of material.  During January and early February 
further rainfall triggered additional movements. 
Given the location of the failure a fast track 
program of investigation, design, construction 
and monitoring was instigated in order to 
stabilize the slope before the wet fall weather 
returned and further movement occurred. 
2 SITE DESCRIPTION 
Flint Hall Farm Cutting was constructed 
between 1976 and 1979 and lies to the south of 
Patterson D
Highways Agency, Temple Quay House, 2 The Square, Temple Quay, Bristol, B51 6HA, UK 
Carder D
TRL, Old Wokingham Road, Crowthorne, Berkshire, RG45 6AU, UK London immediately to the east of Junction 6.   
The cutting takes the Highway through the lower 
slopes of the North Downs escarpment and is 
crossed by Flower Lane Bridge. The slope stands 
at between 11 and 15 degrees with a maximum 
height of 25m and is considered an area of 
outstanding natural beauty.   
3 INVESTIGATION & MECHANISM 
Immediately after the failure, 16 pairs of 
wooden stakes were installed across the toe and 
backscarps and their separation measured to 
determine if the slip was still moving. These pegs 
showed that the slip was marginally stable and 
responded rapidly to rainfall events with further 
movements as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Rainfall & Slope Movements from Pegs  
 
The first stage in the investigation was 
geomorphological mapping.  This showed that the 
failure was of greatest extent to the east of the 
bridge as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Geomorphological Map 
 
In order to investigate the cause of the failure, 
data was obtained from a local water-monitoring 
borehole in a Chalk aquifer.  This showed that the 
groundwater level reached an historical high in 
December 2001 exactly when the slope failed. 
Although this data relates specifically to the 
Chalk, it is considered to be indicative of the 
ground water level in the area of the failure. 
The investigation revealed the slip to be within 
Divisions 9(iv) and 9(iii) of the Gault, Owen, 
(1976), which is a stiff to very stiff gray fissured 
clay, with overlying Head deposits mantling the 
upper portion of the slope as shown in Figure 3.   
Figure 3 Geological Section 
 
Up slope, the Upper Greensand strata and the 
Lower Chalk were encountered, from which much 
of the Head deposits are derived.  For the purposes 
of design, the Gault was not subdivided by grade, 
but residual properties were applied as 
appropriate, and are given in Table 1.  The Head 
deposits, being remoulded significantly during the 
process of solifluction also exhibited principally 
residual behavior. 
 
Table 1  Geotechnical Materials 
Design 
Parameters  
Typical Properties  Material 
c' 
kPa 





Head   0  14  50    40 
Gault 1  24  100  45  35 
Residual 
Gault 
0 14  50     
 
During the course of the investigation a variety 
of instrumentation was installed to monitor slope 
movements including inclinometers, slip 
indicators and survey stakes.  In order to monitor 
the ground water both shallow and deep 
piezometers were installed.  The former displayed 
variable levels at or near the ground surface, 
whilst the deep piezometers were more consistent 
with levels between 2m and 6m below ground 
level. A dewatering trial consisting of 6 ejector 
wells was also carried out in the Gault.  The 
results showed that the deposit could be 
effectively dewatered by up to 6m.  Furthermore 
this confirmed the results of in situ permeability 

































































































































)  Rainfall        Slope 
Movementpermeabilities of between 5x10
-6 and 7x10
-7 m/s.  
However the trial did not affect the water levels 
within the head deposits demonstrating that the 
shallow and deeper water tables were in fact 
independent.  
The inclinometer deflections combined with the 
identification of zones with increased moisture 
content indicated that the basal shear plane, was 
up to 10m below ground level.  This combined 
with the observed steep backscarp, shown in 
Figure  4, and other geomorphological evidence, 
suggested a principally wedge shaped failure.   
Inclinometers installed to the south of the highway 
and the negligible deformation of the hard 
shoulder carrier drain, confirmed that the shear 
plane did not extend beneath the carriageway.  
Trial pitting also exposed the Head/Gault 
boundary.  This was found to be highly polished 
with an elevated natural moisture content 
suggesting that significant movement had 













Figure 4 Shear surface exposed in a trial pit 
 
4 REMEDIAL WORKS DESIGN 
From the outset of the project it was clear that 
the time available for design and construction was 
very limited. This meant that throughout the 
design, consideration was given to build ability 
and speed of construction.  The main stages in the 
design of the remedial works were: 
•  Understanding the current condition and 
developing a design model. 
•  Development of a design philosophy. 
•  Establishing the restoring force, Fx required to 
achieve a desired Factor of Safety (FoS). 
•  Select a pile diameter, length and position 
within the slip. 
•  Calculating the required spacing, shear and 
bending resistance for the piles. 
•  Examine the stability of the slope above and 
below the wall. 
•  Establish the combined FoS. 
4.1 Understanding the current condition and 
develop a design model 
In order to design effective remedial works it 
was vital to understand what controlled the failure 
and be able to model it.  Three sections were 
therefore chosen across the site; section A was to 
the west of the bridge, section B immediately to 
the east of the bridge and section C in the area of 
greatest apparent movement, as shown in Figure 
2.   
A model of the failed slope was then created in 
SlopeW by Geosolve, using the surveyed extent of 
the slip and the soil parameters derived from the 
site investigation and literature.  By adjusting the 
watertable in line with the observed monitoring 
data the factors of safety where seen to vary in 
line with the field observations giving confidence 
in the parameters, mechanism and model.  A 
summary of the lowest FoS are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Lowest FoS for Current Conditions 
4.2 Development of a design philosophy and 
best method  
The stabilization of landslides of this size is not 
normally attempted as the costs are rarely 
justified.  Consequently, there was little precedent 
and no nationally recognized design methodology 
in terms of desired factors of safety.  The client, 
the Highways Agency did however specify a 60 
year design life.  This suggested that a design 
relying solely on drainage, which could block over 
time was not appropriate, especially as the 
counterforts installed during the initial 
construction had not prevented the failure.  In 
addition to the time constraints, the lack of space 
and restrictions on the finished appearance ruled 
out regrading and the construction of a toe berm. 
The combination of limited access and a very deep 
slip surface also made any kind of excavate / 
replace impractical.  A ‘hard’ structural solution to 
pin the sliding mass to the underlying Gault clay 
was therefore required.  Following a Technical 
Options Review involving the client, consultant 
and contractor, a line of discrete bored piles 
emerged as the preferred option. This solution 
offered benefits of shorter lead times, lower cost 
and simpler access.   
Given the uncertainties early in the project and 
after consultation with the client, it was decided to 
adopt a robust approach to the design.  The piles 
were sized to provide a 20% increase in the 
  Section A  Section B  Section C 
FoS 1.01  0.98  0.93 overall stability of the slope ignoring the 
beneficial effects of any drainage.  Improvements 
in the latter would then further increase the overall 
factor of safety, whilst also improving the stability 
of shallow slips.  This approach meant that if the 
drainage blocked, shallow slips may occur but the 
whole slope would not be at risk. 
4.3  Establishing the restoring force, Fx 
By using the SlopeW model the additional 
stabilizing force, Fx, required to give a 20% 
increase in the FoS was determined and is shown 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Forces Required for 20% Increase in FoS  
Sect  Current FoS  Target FoS  
(0.2 increase) 
Force  Fx 
kN/m width 
A 1.01  1.21  52 
B 0.98  1.18  222 
C 0.93  1.13  301 
 
4.4  Selecting a pile length and position 
As the number of possible permutations for the 
pile design was large, a number of the variables 
were decided upon at an early stage of the design 
process.  These included the position on the slope, 
which was fixed at 25m from the back of the kerb. 
This position is approximately one third of the 
way up the failure and reduced the possibility of a 
significant failure above or below the line of piles.  
It also had the added advantage that should the 
piling rig topple over the mast would not reach the 
highway.  The monitoring suggested that the depth 
of movement along the proposed line of the piles 
would be approximately 8m and therefore the 
forces in the piles would be significant.  These 
high forces required a high percentage of steel 
reinforcement and, in order to reduce potential 
problems with reinforcement congestion, the pile 
length was adjusted such that lapping of 
reinforcement would not be necessary.  This led to 
the choice of 16m long piles with the top of the 
pile, 1m below the topsoil to enable the farmer to 
plough over the top of the piles.  
4.5 Calculating the diameter, spacing, shear 
and bending resistance for the piles. 
The spacing of the piles was dependent upon a 
number of factors including the diameter.   
Preliminary calculations showed that 0.75m 
diameter piles would need to be spaced at 1.2 
times the diameter, 1m diameter piles at around 
2.5 times the diameter and 1.2 m diameter piles at 
3.5 times the diameter.  The spacing of the piles is 
critical to the performance of the design as the 
design should maximize the amount of soil 
arching between the piles whilst minimizing the 
flow of soil between piles.  It is generally 
considered that flow between the piles is possible 
at spacings above 5 diameters, Carder & Temporal 
(2000). All three options were closer spaced than 
these criteria. However the 750mm diameter piles 
were rejected on the basis that the spacing would 
not make full benefit of soil arching between 
them.  The 1m diameter pile appeared to offer a 
number of benefits over the 1.2m diameter pile, 
including improved constructability and a greater 
confidence that soil flow would be minimized. 
This size was therefore adopted.  
The design of the piles was based on the 
method proposed by Viggiani, (1981).  By 
adjusting the sizes and capacities of piles it is 
possible using this method to control the ultimate 
failure mechanism.  In the case of Flint Hall Farm 
cutting, a non brittle ultimate failure mechanism 
would be preferable to a brittle one and hence 
Viggiani’s Mode C was considered to be 
appropriate.  In this mode, the pile does not 
develop a plastic hinge and is fixed in the firm 
underlying soil.  If the destabilizing forces are 
increased until failure occurs, the soil will flow 
around the piles as opposed to a more brittle 
failure of the pile itself.  The detail design 
therefore used 16 m piles with the shear force (Tc) 
= restoring force (Fx) = 301 kN/m for an 8m deep 
slip which represents the most critical case, ie 
Section C.  Note the bearing capacity factor within 
the sliding soil ‘n1’ in this case is approximately 
1.5 rather than the value of 4.0 sometimes 
assumed. The working load of the piles (Mw) was 
also restricted to the ultimate capacity/ 1.5. 
Although the analysis suggests that the required 
stabilizing forces decrease as you move westwards 
the same pile design was adopted throughout.   
This was considered appropriate as this reduction 
in Fx was influenced by the pinning effect of the 
existing bridge piles.  There were also signs of 
movement behind the bridge and by installing the 
same pile design in front of it, the new piles will 
stabilize any potentially deeper slips passing 
through or under the bridge piles and not just the 
current shallow failure in that area. The stabilizing 
pile design consisted of: 
•  Seventy four 16m long, 1.05m diameter piles 
installed at 2.5m centers through the main 
slope.  The main reinforcement was 24 No 
50mm, 14m long bars (yield strength 460 
N/mm
2) arranged so that the top and bottom 
2  m of the cages, with the least bending 
moment and shear, only had half the reinforcement quoted above.  The shear 
reinforcement was 16mm bars at 0.3m centers. 
•  Fifteen 9m long, 310mm diameter piles 
installed at 750mm centers beneath Flower 
Lane Bridge. The main reinforcement was 8 
No 16mm bars with 12mm bars at 150 mm 
centers as the shear reinforcement. 
4.6  Design of the Drainage 
The drainage was designed to lower the 
groundwater table on the slope and to 
consequently increase the FoS of the whole slope 
over and above the improvement provided by the 
piles, Hutchinson, (1984).  The drainage also 
provided a minimum FoS above and below the 
piled wall of 1.2, which was vital as shallow slips 
still had the potential to close the highway. 
At the top of the cutting, a horseshoe shaped 
filter drain up to 5m deep was installed to 
intercept groundwater from the Head deposits and 
any other perched water.  This improved the 
stability of both the existing deep seated failure 
and any potential shallow failure in the upper one 
third of the slope.  Where the filter drain crossed 
the backscarp and reverse scarp of the landslip, a 
flexible joint was installed in case of further small 
movements. 
In order to stabilize the bottom half of the slope 
3 m deep counterforts were installed at 6  m 
centers extending from a drain at the slope toe to 
between 20 and 23m up the slope.  These 
counterfort trenches illustrated in Figure 5 also 
picked up the temporary pumped sumps, which 
had been installed in the slope toe as emergency 
works, to lower the water table and control the 
mudflows. 
 
Figure 5  Schematic of Remedial Design 
 
4.7 Establish the Factor of safety with both 
piles and drainage 
Once the drainage design was complete it’s 
effect was included in the model and the 
combined factor of safety determined and is 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 FoS once Piles and Drainage Installed 
  Section A  Section B  Section C 
FoS 1.44  1.28  1.23 
5 CONTRACT STRATEGY, 
CONSTRUCTION AND RISK  
The client took the unusual step of using the 
Engineering Construction Contract Option E (Cost 
Plus) as the Contractor, Raynesway Construction 
would be on site before the design was completed.  
As previously mentioned the contractor was 
involved from very early in the project and a 
partnering approach was used throughout which 
was considered to be vital given the fast-track 
nature of the project.  A good example of this 
approach is that throughout construction a 
member of the design team was always on the site, 











Figure 6 General view of the site from the bridge 
 
Their role included amongst other things, 
gathering information to confirm and update the 
geotechnical model.  For example water strikes in 
the pile bores confirmed the elevation of the main 
shear surface and that it become shallower to the 
west.  Reverse shear surfaces were also identified 
in the toe drain trenches indicating the presence of 
a zone of compression associated with the toe 
bulge at the front of the landslide.  This updated 
ground model was then used to analyze all the 
various construction stages to ensure that the 
stability of the slope was not adversely affected, 
something which as temporary works would 
traditionally be regarded as the contractors 
responsibility.  Despite the resulting restrictions, 
the installation of the piles was complete on the 
21
st September after which the slope was regraded 
to its original profile, the subsoil broken up and 
the slope topsoiled and seeded. 
As the presence of water triggered the failure, 
the ejector wells were maintained operational so that if necessary an increase in stability could be 
obtained by drawing down the water table in the 
Gault, as had happened during the dewatering 
trial.  This secondary purpose had been considered 
before the trial and resulted in the wells being 
located in what was considered to be the most 
critical area of the slip. 
The major residual risk not addressed by the 
design is a different landslide to the existing 
failure, which is only one of many potential 
landslide hazards on the Gault slopes in the area.  
Geomorphological studies have highlighted three 
such features in the direct vicinity of Flint Hall 
Farm, one of, which is active.  In order to mitigate 
this risk in the area to the west of the failure, 
thirteen counterfort drains were installed to extend 
the drainage to a more natural end point.   
6 POST CONSTRUCTION MONITORING 
A number of instruments were installed and 
monitored to continually reduce any residual risk 
at the site by: 
•  Further increasing the understanding of the site 
behavior. 
•  Provide a system of trigger levels. 
 
In addition the monitoring programme provided 
data for part of the Highways Agency research 
project with the Transport Research Laboratory 
(TRL) into the use of piles to stabilize slopes.  The 
monitoring system comprised of: 
•  Daily rainfall records. 
•  Inclinometers installed in the slope within and 
outside the slip. 
•  Inclinometers in both the bored piles and 
between adjacent pairs of piles.  
•  Standpipe piezometers installed in the slope 
within and outside the slip. 
•  Vibrating wire piezometers installed within and 
outside the slip. 
•  Strain gauges installed within the bored piles. 
•  Displacement transducers and tiltmeters on the 
north abutment and central pier of Flower 
Lane Bridge.  
•  Leveling of the bulged hardshoulder. 
 
This instrumentation was a combination of 
existing instrumentation installed during the 
investigation, supplemented by both replacements 
for those lost during construction and 
instrumentation installed by TRL.  As the data 
was collected it was compared against predefined 
trigger levels, which were based on the expected 
behavior of the slope or the predicted load / 
deflection behavior of the piles.  The trigger levels 
were based on a traffic light system and allowed 
for instrument accuracy and reaction time and if 
exceeded required a predefined action to be taken. 
As the behavior of the slope is controlled by 
water one of the key records was daily rainfall and 
is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 Daily Rainfalls from Kenley Airport 
 
As can be seen there was a significant rainfall 
spike in early October comparable to the levels, 
which triggered secondary movements of the 
landslip during spring of 2001.  This rainfall event 
and subsequent smaller events caused the perched 
water level in the Head deposits to rapidly rise 
whilst the lower water level in the Gault clay rose 
more slowly and stabilized after rising 
approximately 2m, to 8m below ground level. 
Subsequently the perched water level exhibited 
high amplitude and short wavelength variations in 
correlation to rainfall, but did not rise above 4m 
below ground level when water began to flow into 
the new filter drains, as shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 Water Level in BH22A  
 
This rise in water levels as expected, caused the 
failed block to remobilize.  Inclinometers I1 and 
I2 in piles 21 and 23 moved by 12mm at their 
head and down to a depth of approximately 9m as 
the piles mobilized their strength to carry the load.  
This pattern was repeated in the mid slope BH4 































































































































































)approximately 13mm of movement along the slip 
plane.  No movement was recorded outside of the 
landslip or in inclinometer I3 between piles 22 and 
23, confirming that the pile spacing was sufficient 
to promote arching and prevent flow between the 
piles.  
Figure 9 Deflection of Inclinometer BH4 
 
The bending moments recorded in the two 
strain gauge instrumented piles showed a 
maximum of approximately 500  kNm at 9m 
below ground level. This correlates well to the 
deflection profiles and shear surface location and 
is well within the pile capacity.  Since October 
2001 no further movements or bending moment 
increases have occurred despite high rainfall in 
early February. 
During the course of the works eight survey 
stations were installed along the kerb in the region 
of the toe heave.  These points were then 
monitored and no further movement occurred 
including after the October rains.  However, the 
survey results showed a settlement of this region 
by up to 50mm when the adjacent toe drainage 
trench passed by which is believed to be an 
expression of the release of lateral pressure in this 
area.  
 
7 BACK ANALYSIS 
Once all the data from the winter of 2001/2002 
had been collected a back analysis was carried out 
to improve our understanding and establish how 
well the design method could predict the 
measured loads in the piles.   
In October, the slope as expected remobilised 
and moved until the piles had generated sufficient 
resistance to provide a Factor of Safety of greater 
than 1.00 and halt the movement.  The bending 
moment profile recorded by the strain gauges at 
this point was then compared against the bending 
moment profile predicted by the design method 
for various different values of Fx. As shown in 
Figure 10, the recorded profile closely matched 
the design profile for a Fx of 40kN/m. 
Figure 10 Predicted & Recorded BM's for pile 24 
 
This Fx was then compared to Figure 11, which 
shows that under the recorded winter conditions 
which were less onerous than the two design cases 
also shown, the design model would predict a 
factor of safety of 1.06.  This suggested that the 
combined instrument, design and modeling error 
was less than 6%. 
Figure 11  Fx vs factor of safety 
 
During the creation of the model the parameter 
with the greatest uncertainty was the residual phi 
angle of the Gault clay as literature quoted values.  
of between 9 and 25 degrees, Forster et al, (1995).  
As shown in Figure 12, the phi value has a marked 
effect on the predicted factor of safety and the 
entire modeling, design and instrumentation error 
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Working Drainage (worst case)
Recorded Winter Conditionsphi, which is considered to be within the accuracy 
of the site investigation. 
Figure 12 Effect of Reducing Phi' 
 
8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The failure was clearly triggered by an 
abnormally high ground water table following 
exceptional winter rainfall.  The pairs of pegs 
installed immediately after the failure were 
particularly effective in monitoring the early 
movement of the failure and showed that it 
responded rapidly to heavy rainfall with renewed 
movements.  Given their low cost and speed of 
installation they offer a very cost effective and 
useful way of monitoring large movements and 
are recommended.  Geomorphological mapping 
was also extremely useful in determining both the 
mechanism of the current failure and the general 
geological setting.  This included the 
identification of other historical landslides and 
areas at risk, information, which is essential to the 
future management of the area. 
A thorough phased site investigation was vital 
to the success of the scheme and as demonstrated 
the selection of appropriate soil parameters is 
critical to an accurate and effective design.   
Continual checking and development of the 
ground model as more information became 
available also gave confidence in the model and 
mechanism, as construction progressed. 
The post construction monitoring has shown 
that despite heavy winter rain sufficient to 
remobilize the slip, the failure has been effectively 
stabilized.  The subsequent back analysis has also 
shown that the ground model accurately 
represented the actual failure and that given 
known conditions the design method of setting 
Tc= Fx  can accurately predict the loads carried by 
the piles.  The back analysis also showed that the 
errors associated with selecting the soil parameters 
can easily be more significant than the 
combination of instrument accuracy, errors 
associated with idealizing a 3D failure to produce 
a 2D model, and assumptions in the design and 
analysis. 
The dewatering trial clearly demonstrated that it 
is possible with ejector wells to lower the ground 
water table in stiff fissured clays.  This principle 
although not exploited with this particular failure 
could be applied over a larger area to improve the 
stability.  The implications of maintaining and 
operating such a system over any length of time 
would however suggest that this is best suited to a 
temporary solution. 
The early Contractor involvement (ECI) and a 
‘partnering approach’ throughout yielded a 
constructive and positive atmosphere and enabled 
the stabilization measures to be completed ahead 
of the demanding schedule and under budget. 
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